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NOTE
LAW OF THE SEA TREATY: REPORT ON THE ENTERPRISE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea' will, when ratified
and implemented, 2 establish an Authority3 to organize and control ac-
tivities conducted in the oceans by state parties outside of their juris-
dictional limits.4 Also to be established is the Enterprise, an interna-
tionally funded and staffed corporate-style organization.5  The
Enterprise will be the mechanism through which the Authority will
conduct operations in that portion of the seas beyond State control
referred to as the Area.* The operations will include the mining, trans-
porting, processing and marketing of the minerals retrieved by the En-
terprise.7 A primary purpose of the Draft Convention is to create a
regime through which the benefits of the vast untapped mineral wealth
of the Area can be shared among all nations under the principle that
these resources are the common heritage of mankind.'
1. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Draft Convention on the
Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.78 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Draft
Convention].
2. The Treaty will enter into force 12 months after the sixtieth instrument of ratifica-
tion or accession is deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations. Id. art.
308.
3. Id. arts. 156-158.
4. The Area is defined as the seabed and ocean floor, including the subsoil, found
beyond the limit of national jurisdiction. Id. art. 1(1).
5. Id. art. 170; Annex IV, arts. 1-13.
6. Draft Convention, supra, art. 1(1).
7. Draft Convention, supra, Annex IV, art. 1(1).
8. Draft Convention, supra, art. 140. Other principle purposes for the creation of the
Law of the Sea Treaty is to codify norms relating to: territorial seas and contiguous
zones, id. arts. 2-33; straits used for international navigation, id. arts. 361-615; rights of
archipelagic states, id. arts. 46-54; exclusive economic zones, id. arts. 55-75; continental
shelf, id. arts. 76-85; high seas, id. arts. 86-120; enclosed or semi-enclosed areas, id. arts.
122-123; the right of access of land-locked states to and from the sea and freedom of
transit, id. arts. 124-132; protection and preservation of the marine environment, id. arts.
192-237; marine scientific research, id. arts. 238-265; and the settlement of disputes, id.
arts. 279-299.
It should be clearly stated at the outset, that the various claims made by the
developed and developing nations regarding the use of the oceans will be discussed in a
generalized manner. There are numerous differences within these two groups with re-
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II. GENERAL CLAIMS: THE BROAD CONTEXT
Common interests motivated the world community to begin nego-
tiations directed toward the codification of a legal regime for an area of
our world over which no nation has undisputed jurisdiction. Customary
international law' and the multilateral treaties 0 in existence were in-
sufficient to deal with the complex problems stemming from the grow-
ing usage of the seas by nations around the world. Such difficulties
arose as coastal states and sea-going nations increasingly initiated op-
posing jurisdictional claims regarding the oceans." Concerns with these
conflicts led to the decision that a comprehensive approach was neces-
sary to deal effectively with the oceans."'
A. The Industrialized Countries
A primary concern"8 of the United States and other great powers
spect to individual national concerns. Nevertheless, for the purpose of understanding the
context in which the Enterprise evolved, such generalizations are sufficiently accurate.
9. The rights and duties regarding seabed resources are affected by the international
law concepts of freedom of the seas, res nullius ("belonging to no one") and res com-
munis ("belonging to everyone"). Collins, Mineral Exploitation of the Seabed:
Problems, Progress, and Alternatives, 12 NAT. Rssoucas LAw. 599, 615 (1979). For a
discussion of these concepts, see Arrow, The Proposed Regime for the Unilateral Ex-
ploitation of Deep Seabed Mineral Resources by the United States, 21 Hsav. INr'L L.J.
337, 352-65 (1980); Collins, supra, at 614-26; Murphy, The Politics of Manganese Nod-
ules: International Considerations and Domestic Legislation, 16 SAN Dmao L. REv. 531,
531-38 (1979). Early United Nations statements on the application of these concepts to
seabed resources demonstrated a preference for res communis. See Moratorium Resolu-
tion, G.A. Res. 2574, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 112, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969),
reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 422 (1970); Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and
the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction,
G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1971), reprinted
in 10 !,L.M. 220 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Declaration of Principles). For a critical
discussion of these documents and their legal effect, see Arrow, supra, at 368-77; Mur-
phy, supra, at 38-41.
10. The rights and duties regarding seabed resources under present international law
are codified in the following conventions: Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contigu-
ous Zone, entered into force Sept. 10, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 515
U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the Continental Shelf, entered into force June 10, 1964, 15
U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on the High Seas, entered
into force Sept. 30, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
11. Note, International Seabed Resources: The U.S. Position, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 903,
905-06 (1975). See also Darman, The Law of the Sea: Rethinking U.S. Interests, 56
Fo0MGN AnF. 373, 375-79 (1978).
12. Preamble, Draft Convention, supra note 1, at 1. The preamble recognizes that
"the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a
whole." Id.
13. Foremost among the commercial concerns regarding navigation was the transpor-
tation of oil, an activity upon which Western economies are highly dependent. See
Darman, supra note 11, at 381-82.
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during the last few decades has been the rapidly expanding jurisdic-
tional claims made by coastal nations." Many nations have been claim-
ing jurisdiction over areas of the sea beyond the traditional three mile
limit.1 5 Were this to go unchecked, the impact on the existing freedoms
of the maritime movement of commercial traffic" and the mobility of
military forces 7 would be severe. If the trend were allowed to continue,
the ultimate result would be the unilateral division of the oceans.18
In addition to claims for freedom of navigation, the developed na-
tions want to proceed with the extraction of oil and minerals from the
seabed area beyond national jurisdiction.1 9 The deep seabed natural
resources, of interest here, are limited in supply and critical in impor-
tance to Western economies. 0 The advancement, therefore, of ocean
mining technology, coupled with impressive estimates of vast amounts
of recoverable minerals, provided further motivation to seek an inter-
national agreement on the legal status of the oceans."1 Other general
claims, for example, relate to the management and conservation of
marine resources, the protection of the marine environment and coast-
lines from pollution, access to the oceans for scientific research and
mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of various types of interna-
tional disputes regarding the oceans."2
14. The "jurisdictional creep" had involved 101 countries by 1980. These nations
have claimed from 12 to 200 mile territorial seas. Certain of these claims restrict the
right of innocent passage by requiring prior authorization or notification. Richardson,
Power, Mobility and the Law of the Sea, 58 FoaRIoN AFn. 902, 904-05 (1980). The 12
mile claim, if implemented globally, would close more than 100 straits. Id. at 905.
15. Darman, supra note 11, at 375.
16. The transportation of oil is an example of such traffic. Id. at 381-82. The "free-
dom of transit" is an important maritime freedom. Territorial sea claims of twelve miles
or more by coastal nations would close off more than 100 straits from traditional high
seas transit and instead impose "innocent passage" requirements that are more restric-
tive. Id. at 375.
17. There is a pressing importance attached to the projection of United States power
for the protection of vulnerable Middle East oil and oil tanker supply lines. Moreover,
the United States may desire to exert its influence in areas far from its borders by a
demonstration of military resolve. The United States Navy provides the needed flex-
ibility to perform such protective and deterrent missions. See Richardson, supra note 14,
at 906-10. For a discussion of United States strategic interests, including the need to
position anti-submarine listening devices on the continental shelf, see Osgood, U.S. Se-
curity Interests in Ocean Law, 2 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 1, 3-5 (1970).
18. Darman, supra note 11, at 381.
19. Arrow, supra note 9, at 340.
20. The minerals are in nodule form and are primarily composed of nickel, manga-
nese, copper and cobalt. For a detailed discussion of the contents of the nodules, the uses
for the metals of which they are composed, and the strategic importance of these metals
to the United States, see id. at 340-44.
21. See Maw, Law of the Sea VIII - Forward, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 483, 483-86
(1976).
22. Note, supra note 11, at 904.
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B. The Emerging Countries
A primary claim made by the developing countries is that the re-
sources in the Area do not belong to individual nations, but are the
common property of the world community of nations. 3 The developing
countries felt that no part of the Area should be appropriated by any
one nation, but should be exploited for the benefit of mankind as a
whole. " This concept was adopted in 1971 as a resolution of the
United Nations General Assembly25 by a vote of 108 to 0, with 14 ab-
stentions." But the method of achieving this internationally accepted
goal of sharing seabed resources was not easy to agree upon.
The Law of the Sea Convention grew from a need and desire to
reconcile all these conflicting claims. The major industrial powers ac-
cepted, within the total balance of the Law of the Sea package, the
general principle of sharing. In return, they were guaranteed access to
the Area for commercial purposes and guaranteed rights of transit pas-
sage with definitive territorial sea jurisdiction limits.
Ill. SPECIFIC CLAIMS: THE AUTHORITY AND ENTERPRISE
The vehicle through which the sharing of resource profits will take
place is the Authority. s The Authority will collect taxes from seabed
miners29 and regulate production levels to protect the economies of
land-based producers of similar minerals.30 Aside from these functions,
the Authority is empowered to sponsor mineral exploitation through
its operational arm, the Enterprise." The Enterprise is designed to be-
come a financially viable organization that will be able to effectively
compete with the international mining consortia already formed and
23. See generally Adede, Law of the Sea - Developing Countries' Contributions to
the Development of the Institutional Arrangements for the International Sea-bed Au-
thority, 4 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1 (1977).
24. Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 140.
25. Declaration of Principles, supra note 9.
26. Murphy, supra note 9, at 539. The United States voted in favor of the resolution.
Id.
27.A major ideological barrier was the developing nations' call for a new international
economic order. This goal is based upon a redistribution of the world's wealth and tech-
nology in favor of the developing nations. Acquiescence by the developed nations to a
plan for the effective distribution and international sharing in the profits from seabed
mining was viewed as a major step toward that goal. Hardy, The Implications of Alter-
native Solutions for Regulating the Exploitation of Seabed Minerals, 31 INT'L ORG. 313,
329 (1977).
28. Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 157.
29. Id. Annex III, art. 13.
30. Draft convention, supra note 1, art. 151(2)(b).
31. Id. art. 170.
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ready to begin mining operations.12 After an initial start-up period, the
Enterprise will be taxed by the Authority." The funds will be distrib-
uted to developing nations and adversely affected land-based mineral
exporters.'
A. The Industrialized Countries
Based upon scientific studies, the developed nations consider the
seabed as a potent, long-term source of scarce raw materials.3 5 They
desire to develop the Area with a minimum of international bureau-
cratic market controls. These nations argue that if the aim is to gener-
ate maximum revenue for the Authority, there should be few controls
on production as the free market forces are the most efficient stimulant
to production." From this view, unrestrained access is the best, and
perhaps the only, way to create an economic climate that would stimu-
late risk taking by private investors.3 7
It is emphasized that free market economies cannot compel invest-
ment despite a strategic need for certain metals.38 The only way to en-
sure that necessary large capital outlays will be forthcoming is to cre-
ate a legal regime that will protect corporate interests. This means a
voting system, within the seabed Authority, that will be responsive to
the need for corporate profits in these capital-intensive ventures.
39
The industrialized countries claim that the Authority, as now
designed, will be guided by the tyranny of the majority; namely, the
developing countries.' 0 The Assembly, to be composed of all treaty sig-
32. Mining Consortia or Corporate Miner as used hereinafter will refer also to State
Parties or States' Entities or natural juridical persons. Id. art. 153(2)(b).
33. Id. Annex III, art. 13.
34. Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 173(2). The funds of the Authority must first
be applied to meet the administrative expenses of the Authority. Id. art. 173(1). The
remaining funds may be distributed by the Authority in an equitable manner by taking
into consideration the particular interests and needs of the developing countries. Id. art.
160(2)(f). In addition, the Assembly is directed to establish a system of compensation or
other measures of economic adjustment assistance to aid developing countries that suffer
serious adverse effects on their export earnings or economies resulting from a reduction
in the price of an affected mineral or the volume of mineral exported, to the extent that
such reduction is caused by activities in the Area. Id. art. 151(4).
35. Arrow, supra note 9, at 341-44.
36. See generally Lowe, The International Seabed and the Single Negotiating Text,
13 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 489, 523-32 (1976).
37. Id. at 530.
38. See generally Hardy, supra note 27, at 329. Hardy discusses the ideological de-
bate between the free market advocates and the developing nations' call for a new inter-
national economic order in the context of Seabed mining and the common heritage of
mankind.
39. See infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
40. Adede, supra note 23, at 42.
1981] NOTE
N.Y.J. INT'L & Coup. L.
natories and to be regarded as the supreme organ within the Authority,
is based upon the democratic principle of one-nation, one-vote, in its
decision-making process. 41 The industrialized nations, although pos-
sessing much of the world's economic and political power, are limited
in number; therefore such a voting system would render them under-
represented in relation to their power.4
2
The industrialized nations assert that their mining companies will
suffer a competitive disadvantage because the Enterprise will initially
operate free of tax obligations to the Authority. 43 They also fear that
their corporate representatives are to be subjected to an arbitrary sys-
tem of price and production controls that unreasonably favor the inter-
ests of land-based miners, who would be largely unaffected by seabed
mining for almost twenty years." Finally, it is claimed that the forced
transfer of technology ignores the fact that its development results
from both economic incentives and property rights." Lack of protec-
tion for technological developments negates the incentive to develop
new technologies necessary for any deep seabed exploitation. Without
such technology, no one could benefit from seabed mining.
The industrialized nations want clear and precise language in the
Treaty to minimize discretionary action by the Authority. They are
concerned with predictability under the licensing regime for mine oper-
ations. Hence, they want these contract obligations to be explicit and
detailed, especially regarding the granting of licenses and the security
of tenure at the mine sites.
B. The Emerging Countries
The developing nations, on the other hand, claim that an effective
legal mechanism is necessary to protect the world's "last great store of
undivided and accessible resources.' 47 They do not want parts of the
41. Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 159(1)(5).
42. Darman, supra note 11, at 387-88. The Authority, which would be governed by
the Assembly, is based on a "one-state, one-vote" system, "a system which bears no sen-
sible relationship to one-man, one-vote democracy, or to the real distribution of power,
values or interests." Id.
43. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex IV. art. 10(3).
44. Pontecorvo, Reflections on the Economics of the Common Heritage of Mankind:
The Organization of the Deep Sea Mining Industry and the Expected Benefits from
Resource Exploitation, 2 OCEAN Dv. & INT'L L. 203, 208 (1974). "[T]he existing rate of
growth in demand seems to be in excess of the rate of growth of ocean output so that any
impact, over the next decade, on land-based producers and price would be very modest."
Id.
45. Darman, supra note 11, at 387-88.
46. Lowe, supra note 36, at 531. At present, the extent of the Authority's power is
uncertain. Id.
47. Id. at 489.
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Area to become the new colonies of the industrialized nations.' 8 To this
end, they desire strong central control over mining activities. The de-
veloping group of nations want to ensure that they will, in fact, derive
benefits, as co-owners, from exploitation of the common heritage of
mankind. 49 This is viewed as an important, potential source of steady
financial revenue, badly needed to offset the damage to their fragile
economies caused by world-wide economic instability.0°
Within this group of developing nations, land-based producers of
copper, manganese, nickel and cobalt derive substantial earnings from
mineral exports. They desired production controls over the seabed
miners in order to minimize disadvantageous metal market price fluc-
tuations that may occur when the supply of a commodity, relative to
demand, increases markedly.51
Consequently, the developing nations want generalized language in
the Convention stating broad principles and leaving implementation of
these principles to the Authority. Within the Authority, the developing
nations will command substantial majorities, thus, generalized lan-
guage will make future interpretation of the principles and provisions
more succeptible to a slant in their favor.5"
The developing nations, unable to effectively provide the financial
and technological necessities to the Enterprise, convinced the devel-
oped countries to do so. This compromise was known as the parallel or
twin track system, with the Enterprise on one track and the corporate
miners on the other.58 Guarantees of access to the seabed resources and
48. Id. at 494. It has been suggested that a powerful Authority that reflects majority
interests could prevent one or more of the developed nations from achieving a dominant
position in the exploitation of the Area. Richardson, Introduction to Law of the Sea XI,
16 SAN DIEGO L. Rzv. 451, 454 (1979). John Breaux notes that France, the United King-
dom, Japan and the Soviet Union are also concerned with the prospect that one nation,
namely the United States, will obtain an overwhelming competitive and strategic posi-
tion. Breaux, The Diminishing Prospects for an Acceptable Law of the Sea Treaty, 19
VA. J. INT'L L. 257, 270-71 (1979).
49. Lowe, supra note 36, at 523.
50. Murphy, supra note 9, at 535. In addition to a concern for a new source of incre-
mental wealth, there is a fear that the industrialized nations will begin seabed operations
before a treaty to prevent the confiscation of these resources becomes effective. Id.
51. Id. at 534-35. Canada, a major exporter of nickel, supported the developing na-
tions on this point. Id.
52. Lowe, supra note 36, at 511. The functions of the Authority would be discharged
by a thirty-six state Council, guided by policies laid down by the Assembly, chosen with
regard to equitably distributing seats among all geographical regions of member states.
Id.
53. Richardson, supra note 14, at 917. Although the parallel system has been agreed
to, there are still significant details yet to be resolved such as voting rights in the Council
and production ceilings. For a discussion of the details of financing to be provided for
the Enterprise, see Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea: The Eighth Session (1979), 74 Am. J. INT'L L. 1, 13-15 (1980).
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meaningful voting rights within the Authority were conceded in return
for solid commitments to initially finance the Enterprise and provide it
with the technology necessary to become an effective operation.
IV. ENTERPRISE: FINANCE, OPERATIONS, TECHNOLOGY
The rules governing the Enterprise are set forth in Annex IV of
the Convention.54 Other applicable language appears in Annex III and
in Part XI of the main contents. Since the Enterprise is structured as
an element of the Authority, a brief look, at the principal organs of the
Authority will prove useful.
A. The Authority
Not surprisingly in the creation of a new international organiza-
tion, the proposed treaty envisions a composition similar to the United
Nations structure of the Security Council and General Assembly. The
Authority is composed of two decision-making elements, the Assem-
bly 5 and the Council." The Council, composed of thirty-six nations
representing different economic, political and geographic factors, 57 will
have the power to approve or disapprove a mining contract applica-
tion.5 8 The Council, as the executive organ of the Authority, will also
be responsible for determining all of the specific policies of the Author-
54. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex IV.
55. Draft Convention, supra note 1, arts. 159, 160. The Assembly is the supreme or-
gan of the Authority.
56. Id. arts. 161-165. The Council has a more direct and significant relationship with
the Enterprise than does the Assembly and therefore will be examined first.
57. Id. art. 161(1).
58. Id. art. 162(2)(j). This article provides that the Council shall approve plans of
work in accordance with Annex III, article 6. The Council shall act upon each plan of
work within 60 days of its submission by the Legal and Technical Commission at a ses-
sion of the Council in accordance with the following procedures:
(i) if the Commission recommends the approval of a plan of work it shall be
deemed to have been approved by the Council if no Council member sub-
mits to the President within 14 days a specific written objection alleging
non-compliance with the requirements of Annex III, article 6. In the
event that there is an objection, the conciliation procedure contained in
article 161, paragraph 7 (e), shall apply. If, at the end of the conciliation
process, the objection to the approval of the plan of work is still main-
tained, the plan of work shall be deemed to have been approved by the
Council unless the Council disapproves it by consensus among its mem-
bers excluding the State or States, if any, making the application or
sponsoring the applicant;
(ii) if the Commission recommends the disapproval of a plan of work or does
not make a recommendation, the Council may decide to approve the plan
of work by a three-fourths majority of the members present and voting,
provided that such majority includes a majority of members participating
in that session.
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ity.59 Each member of the Council will have one vote." The three-tier
voting procedure61  for substantive decision-making, however, is
designed to assure the United States and other nations prepared to
mine the Area, of protection for special interests.2
Substantive proposals must be accepted by either a two-thirds s or
three-fourths majority"4 or by consensus, 65 depending upon the nature
of the issue. For example, many key decisions such as the awarding of
mining production authorizations and controlling activities in the
Area6 7 require a three-fourths majority. Hence, more than nine votes
are needed to block a decision of the Council on these issues. Accord-
ing to the distribution of Council membership, the developed nations
of the West will have at least six votes,"' and the East will have no less
than three.6 The remaining seats will be filled mainly by developing
nations.
7 0
In the worst case, with the developing countries taking a solid po-
sition on a decision adverse to Western interests, a blocking fourth
would require voting help from the Eastern (Socialist) nations.7 1 The
probability of this happening, however, is slim, because the developing
countries have strong economic and political motivations to accommo-
date Western interests, thus avoiding the need of the West to rely on
Eastern voting support in the Council.
The other decision-making element of the Authority, the Assem-
bly, will also operate on the one-nation, one-vote system 7 2 but, unlike
the Council, it will be composed of all states that are party to the Con-
vention. 78 The Assembly will be the supreme organ of the Authority
vis-a-vis the Council.74 In fact, it will elect the members of the Coun-
cil 72 and establish general policies to guide the Council and Enter-
59. Id. art. 162(1).
60. Id. art. 161(6).
61. Id. art. 161(7).
62. Oxman, supra note 53, at 15-17.
63. Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 161(7)(b).
64. Id. art. 161(7)(c).
65. Id. art. 161(7)(d).
66. Id. art. 162(2)0).
67. Id. art. 162(2)(k).
68. Id. art. 161(1)(a),(b).
69. Id. art. 161(1)(a),(b),(e).
70. Id. art. 161(1)(c),(d),(e).
71. An example of such a situation would be an attempt to issue emergency orders to
suspend operations in the Area due to a threat to the marine environment, pursuant to
id. art. 162(2)(v).
72. Id. art. 159(5).
73. Id. art. 159(1).
74. Id. art. 160(1).
75. Id. art. 160(2)(a).
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prise.76 Despite the reference to the Assembly as the supreme organ of
the Authority, the Council will, subject to the Assembly's general pol-
icy guidelines, retain sufficient independence in managing seabed
mining.
77
The Assembly will vote to elect the members of the Governing
Board and the Director-General of the Enterprise.7 8 The majoritarian
status of developing states in the Assembly ensures that the governing
elements of the Enterprise will consist mainly of nationals from their
group. But the advanced position in mining technology and manage-
ment expertise already held by the developed countries presented a
problem of viability for the Enterprise s.7 The solution was to convince
those nations that wanted to exploit the seabed to provide the Enter-
prise with the necessary tools.8 0
B. The Enterprise
The Enterprise, is that arm of the Authority that is to exploit the
seabed in the name of all mankind.8 ' It is thus empowered to engage in
mine operations and will itself perform functions similar to those of
the private mining companies that are to be licensed by the Author-
ity.8' This will include recovery and transportation of the nodules to its
own processing operations and marketing of the minerals. Operation-
ally, it will be a highly bureaucratic organization similar to the private
mining consortia.
The Enterprise will enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy,8 3 but
of course its actions must be in accordance with the directives of the
Council, the general policies of the Assembly, and the dictates of the
Convention. " The Draft Convention provides that "in developing the
resources of the Area. . . the Enterprise shall . . . operate on sound
commercial principles."' 5 Hence, a question arises as to the extent to
which this autonomy shields the Enterprise from interference by the
political bodies. Commercial competition from the consortia will be
76. Id. art. 160(1).
77. See id. art. 162.
78. Id. art. 160(2)(c).
79. See generally Sebenius & Pal, Evolving Financial Terms of Mineral Agreements:
Risks, Rewards and Participation in Deep Seabed Mining, 15 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 75,
76-77 (1980).
80. For a discussion of the elements of compromise offered by the United States at
the Conference, see Hardy, supra note 27, at 328.
81. Draft convention, supra note 1, art. 153(1).
82. Id. annex IV, art. 1(1).
83. Id. art. 2(2).
84. Id. art. 2(1).
85. Id. art. 1(3) (emphasis added).
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substantial."0 If the Enterprise is hindered by dictates and policies
flowing from the Council and Assembly, then its commercial viability
may be jeopardized.
8 7
1. The Governing Board
Structurally, the Enterprise will consist of a Governing Board, a
Director-General and staff.8 8 The Governing Board will be composed of
fifteen members who will be elected by the Assembly.89 The Board
members shall act in their personal capacity9" performing their respon-
sibilities independent of any national interest, and the members of the
Authority shall refrain from all attempts to influence Board mem-
bers. " ' This provision stems from a desire to prevent political partisan-
ship from paralyzing the functioning of the Board and thereby retard-
ing the growth of the Enterprise.2 Although no specific qualifications
have been detailed, the Board members shall be of the highest compe-
tence and qualified in the relevant fields." It is significant that the
Board members are elected by one body, the Assembly, yet are subject
to the directives of the other, the Council. This creates the potential
problem of mixed loyalties.9 4
The Board will direct the commercial operations of the Enter-
86. Several consortia have already been formed and are functioning. They have es-
tablished management structures, have been developing financial and technological
objectives, and have begun prospecting and equipment testing. Initially, they may have
advantages such as efficiency of operations which naturally develop as an ongoing organi-
zation refines its activities. See N.Y. Times, April 7, 1981, § 4, at 1, col. 3, regarding who
the consortia are, their affiliated members and one of the technological approraches to
mining the deep seabed.
87. Roy Lee, secretary to the First Committee of the Law of the Sea Conference and
legal officer at the United Nations Seretariat, has indicated his concern with the relation-
ship of the Enterprise to the Council and the Assembly. He points out that important
decisions about Enterprise operations such as production authorization and approval of
work plans and retention of net income require ratification by these bodies. Since the
Council and the Assembly will be composed of members selected on a political basis,
such a requirement may adversely affect the stated objective that "sound commercial
principles" be utilized by the Enterprise's management in making decisions. See Lee,
The Enterprise: Operational Aspects and Implications, 15 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 62,
64-65 (1980).
88. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex IV, art. 4.
89. Id. art. 5(1).
90. Id. art. 5(5).
91. Id.
92. See Lee, supra note 87, at 63.
93. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex IV, art. 5(1).
94. There are other, related potential problems attendant to the Director-General's
interrelationships with the Assembly, Council and Governing Board. See infra text ac-
companying notes 103-10.
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prise.15 These will include: developing specific business plans for sea-
bed mining and submitting them to the Council;96 authorizing the ac-
quisition of technology;9 establishing terms for joint ventures to be
conducted in cooperation with other state or corporate parties;9 rec-
ommending the portion of net income to be retained with the remain-
ing portion going to the Assembly for the purpose of equitable sharing
in the common heritage;99 authorizing the purchase of goods and ser-
vices;100 drafting internal rules covering the functions and tenure of the
staff;10 1 and borrowing funds subject to approval by the Council.0 2
2. The Director-General
The Director-General shall be the chief executive officer and legal
representative of the Enterprise, elected by the Assembly subsequent
to nomination by the Governing Board.10 3 Pursuant to Board guide-
lines, the Director-General will be responsible for the organization,
management and dismissal of the staff of the Enterprise.0 4
It is important to note that unlike chief executive officers in most
United States corporations, the Director-General is not a member of
the Board, but will be allowed to particpate without voting in pertinent
Board meetings. Also, contrary to our domestic experience and that of
other nations, the Director-General is not elected by the Board. These
factors, especially the latter, may have a serious negative effect upon
the working relationships within the Enterprise. Since the Director-
General must report directly to the Governing Board, the provisions
for Board nomination and limited Board participation are designed to
"avoid potential confusion and division within the Enterprise."' 0 5
The Director-General shall act independently of advice or instruc-
tions from any government, and the Authority shall respect the inter-
national character of his office, and refrain from any attempts to influ-
ence him or the staff.'" The Director-General, as chief executive, will
bear a heavy responsibility for the success or failure of this unique in-
ternational undertaking. As chief executive of a commercial quasi-cor-
porate entity, the Director-General faces the burden of being responsi-
95. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex IV, art. 6.
96. Id. art. 6(b).
97. Id. art. 6(d).
98. Id. art. 6(e).
99. Id. art. 6(f).
100. Id. art. 6(h).
101. Id. art. 6(j).
102. Id. art. 6(m).
103. Id. art. 7(1).
104. Id. art. 7(2).
105. Id. art. 7(1).
106. Id. art. 7(2).
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ble, with the Board, to the Authority, a political organization.'1"
Despite the provisions that mandate political independence and opera-
tions based upon the "highest standards of efficiency and of technical
competence,"10 8 the potential for partisan disruption exists. The Direc-
tor-General must, therefore, be especially adept at political compro-
mise. Ideally, such an individual should have been involved in the gen-
esis of the Convention and should be familiar with many of the
personalities that will become members of the Assembly and ,Council.
A related duty for the Director-General will be to coordinate and
integrate a staff of assistants recruited from varied geographical ar-
eas.10 9 This will, naturally, involve a variety of ethnic, cultural and lin-
guistic differences. Thus, the Director-General must be a highly com-
petent business administrator in addition to being an effective
diplomat. °
3. Funding
Initially, the primary sources of funding will be amounts received
from the Authority and amounts borrowed in the markets of state par-
ties."' Theoretically, the Enterprise will eventually achieve profitabil-
ity and will be able to sustain itself with income it generates. Sufficient
funds will be made available in the form of loans for administrative
costs and for the exploration and exploitation of one mine site, includ-
ing transportation, processing and marketing of the final product." 2
Start-up funding will be in the form of loans. One-half of these
loans will be in the form of long-term interest-free funds provided by
all state parties proportioned according to their scale of assessments
for the United Nations' budget at that time."' The other half will
mainly be borrowed from various lending institutions, with the state
parties guaranteeing the loans on the same proportional scale." 4 Fur-
thermore, the state parties are to make serious efforts to facilitate and
expedite these loans from the capital markets and financial
institutions.' 5
The interest-free loans will be made available immediately, within
thirty to sixty days, after implementation of the Treaty; the debt guar-
107. Draft Convention, supra note 1, art. 158.
108. Id. Annex IV, art. 5(1).
109. Id. art. 7(4).
110. Lee has emphasized that the competence of the Director-General is a "critical
element" if the Enterprise is to be successful. Lee, supra note 87, at 63.
111. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex IV, art. 11(1).
112. Id. art. 11(3)(a).
113. Id. art. 11(3)(b).
114. Id.
115. Id. art. 11(2)(b).
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antees will also be expedited. 1 6 The goal is to get the Enterprise oper-
ational and on its track quickly in order that it might keep pace, under
the twin track system, with the corporate miners on the other track.
The Enterprise must use its income to pay the Authority for the
right to explore and mine the Area according to the same financial
terms as will the private consortia." 7 Essentially this will consist of a
one million dollar annual payment from the date of entry into contract,
and another fee, either the one million dollar fixed fee or a production
charge, whichever is greater, once commercial production begins.11 8
The Assembly shall, for an initial period of up to ten years, exempt the
Enterprise from this tax burden so it can become self-supporting.' 19
This provision would give the Enterprise the potential to become very
competitive in seabed mining since it would have a commercial advan-
tage over other mining groups. In addition, these groups will be subject
to national taxes that will not affect the Enterprise. 20
The operations of the Enterprise will depend upon the application
to and approval of the Council for specific mining projects, just as will
the private mining companies. 2 ' The application must contain evi-
dence supporting its financial and technological capability. 2 ' When a
project is approved, the Enterprise can proceed according to its plan
and will hold title to all minerals produced. 23 The main distinction is
that the Enterprise can apply for reserved sites that others cannot."'
4. Parallel Exploitation
The Draft Convention provides for a dual access, parallel method
of seabed resource mining.'25 In exchange for the right to mine the
nodules of the international seabed, the corporate miner will, in return,
reserve an area for exploitation by the Enterprise. 2 ' This system of
dual resource access will operate in the manner described below.
Companies applying for the right to exploit a particular location,
must include the coordinates of a total area sufficient to support two
mining operations of approximately equal commercial mineral value.
27
The Authority will then determine the half to be reserved for use by
116. Id. art. 13(3)(d).
117. Id. art. 10(1).
118. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex III, art. 13(3).
119. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex IV, art. 10(3).
120. Breaux, supra note 48, at 283-85.
121. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex IV, art. 12(1),(2).
122. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex III, art. 12(2).
123. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex IV, art. 12(4).
124. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex III, arts. 8-9.




the Enterprise as well as the area to be operated by the mining appli-
cant.12 8 The reserved site will be set aside for possible future, if not
immediate, exploitation by the Enterprise, either alone or in a joint
venture with developing states.'29 The mining applicant will be able to
commence operations on his track as soon as the plan of work for the
non-reserved area is approved and the contract signed. "
5. Technology
Technology is a critical factor for the development of the deep sea-
bed industry since the challenges presented by working three miles be-
low the ocean surface are enormous. It was, therefore, deemed neces-
sary that the technology needed for the Enterprise to become an
effective and competitive seabed miner be provided to it by those ap-
plicants granted a license to operate in the Area.1
3
1
Every successful applicant for a mining contract will submit to the
Authority, upon request, a description of the equipment and methods
to be used for exploitation of the deep seabed. 3 2 Furthermore, the ap-
plicant will identify the source from which such technology can be ob-
tained by the Enterprise.' 3 In addition, any substantial equipment
change or technical innovation shall be reported to the Authority.' "
Consequently, it appears that the Enterprise will always have access to
the most current technology available.
Every contract granted will include a supplementary agreement
providing for the direct transfer of technology to the Enterprise when
and if the Authority requests.' "These agreements will, however, ex-
pire ten years after the Enterprise begins commercial production. " " If,
for example, the Enterprise is unable to obtain, on the open market,
the technology that a particular contractor will be using, then the con-
tractor will transfer the technology directly to the Enterprise at fair
and reasonable terms.' The operator will also obtain written assur-
ance from the third-party owner of any other technology to be used,
that such technology will be made available to the Enterprise on fair
terms.3 8 The Enterprise may require that the operator acquire, when-
ever possible, and at reasonable cost, a legally binding right to transfer
128. Id.
129. Id. art. 9.
130. Id. art. 8.
131. Id. art. 5(3)(a).
132. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex IV, art. 5(1).
133. Id.
134. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex III, art. 5(2).
135. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex IV, art. 5(3)(a).
136. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex III, art. 5(7).
137. Id. art. 5(3)(a).
138. Id. art. 5(3)(b).
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to the Enterprise, technology that the operator will use which would
otherwise be neither transferable nor available on the open market. 3 9
The operator will also provide assistance if the Enterprise chooses to
negotiate directly with the owner for the acquisition of relevant
technology.
1 40
All of these provisions related to technology were considered nec-
essary to provide effective guarantees that the Enterprise will have the
capability to use the funding provided to maintain and operate a viable
system. The technology includes specialized equipment, technical
know-how, manuals, designs, operating instructions, training and tech-
nical advice, and all other types of assistance.'4 ' Essentially, the Draft
Convention only requires the operator to transfer technology when it is
not available on the open market.'4 2 At all times, fair and reasonable
remuneration will be made for the technology provided. 143 If the tech-
nology is available on the market, an adequately financed Enterprise
will purchase the necessary technology outright or develop it indepen-
dently.14 4 The transfer provisions are not all encompassing, but rather
are limited to mining technology and do not include processing infor-
mation. Moreover, no proprietary data need be disclosed to the Enter-
prise.115 These provisions are, in essence, intended to assure that the
operators do not artifically restrict access to the technology.
6. Joint Ventures
Joint ventures or production sharing between the mining contrac-
tor and the Authority are provided for through the Enterprise, and will
be protected against termination, suspension or revision. 46 The Au-
thority shall provide incentives, financial or otherwise, for joint ar-
rangements, in order to stimulate the transfer of technology as well as
to train the personnel of the Authority and of the developing na-
tions. 47 The same rights and obligations present for individual opera-
139. Id. art. 5(3)(c).
140. Id. art. 5(3)(d).
141. Id. art. 5(8).
142. Id. art. 5(3)(a).
143. Id.
144. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex IV, art. 12(3).
145. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex III, art. 14.
146. Id. art. 11. A joint venture is a business arrangement similar to a partnership. It
has been broadly described as a combination of two or more parties that contribute
funds, facilities or services to the business enterprise for their mutual benefit. W. G.
FRIEDMANN & G. KALMANOFF, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BusiNEss VENT REs 6 (1961). In the
present context, the Enterprise and an independent contractor or a consortium that is
willing to provide the necessary technology or capital investment would join together to
engage in a mining operation. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex III, arts. 11.
147. Draft Convention, supra note 1, Annex III, arts. 11(2), 13(i)(d).
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tors, vis-a-vis, the Authority, will attach to joint operators proportion-
ally to the extent of the joint venture share."4 8 Of particular interest
are joint ventures between the operator and the Enterprise itself. " 9
Potential drawbacks could stem from the joint venture arrange-
ment itself if it is not carefully drafted to reflect the expectations and
basic goals of each partner. The provisions should include the scope,
structure and duration of the project; the termination clauses; the pro-
portional shares of investment and revenues; the nature of the deci-
sion-making and management processes; the appropriate law to be ap-
plied; and finally the dispute resolution forum, should a conflict arise
between the parties.' 50
There are several potential benefits to the Enterprise should it
enter into a joint venture arrangement with a mining contractor. They
include: (1) easier access to technology and critical management skills;
(2) possible access to nodule processing technology; (3) reduced invest-
ment risks through sharing of costs; (4) a more gradual move into inde-
pendent operation; and (5) more effective and extensive training for
personnel from developing countries. The possible benefits, to the En-
terprise in technology are especially important due to its probable
weaknesses in this area.
On the other hand, the corporate mining operator could derive
substantial benefits from a joint venture with the Enterprise including:
(1) sharing of the business risks involved in large, long-term invest-
ments; (2) reduced complications from the technology transfer provi-
sions; and (3) access to a second mine site, the reserved area, held by
the Authority.
The use of joint ventures between the Enterprise and mining con-
tractors might very well enhance cooperation between the Authority
and the joint venturing mining contractors. If the Enterprise becomes
engaged in a joint venture, the Authority will naturally be interested in
its success. That interest will undoubtedly redound to the benefit of
the contractor. This could take the form of facilitating its success by
removing political difficulties in the development of the joint venture.
The joint arrangements are an acceptable and excellent vehicle
through which to provide the incentive for risk capital commitments
and thereby carry out the provision that calls upon the Authority to
148. Id. art. 11(3).
149. Id. art. 9(2). Joint ventures may also be conducted by the Enterprise with State
Parties that are developing states, and their nationals. Id.
150. For a detailed examination of how these points should be handled by both the
Enterprise and the mining groups, see, Information Note on Joint Ventures, Part B -
Some Operational Aspects, U.N. Doc. GE. 75-64399, C.1/Working Paper No.5/Add.1
(Apr. 10, 1975). Choice of forum for dispute resolution may be limited to the Sea-Bed
Disputes Chamber by article 187(c) or binding commercial arbitration under article
188(2)(a).
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provide certain incentives. Finally, joint ventures would reduce the fear
that despite the technology transfer provisions, the Enterprise may
still be unable to acquire effectively the necessary technology and
managment skills. If meaningful incentives are provided to joint ven-
turing contractors, the outlook for the future development of the En-
terprise would be improved.
CONCLUSION
EMERGING PROBLEMS AND REMAINING
CONSIDERATIONS
If and when the Enterprise is in full operation, its success will not
be solely a function of the competence of Enterprise personnel or the
functioning of the Authority, but will also depend on a variety of com-
plex and interrelated factors.
A. Product Marketing
Annex IV of the Convention clearly envisages that the Enterprise
will generate its own profits and will be financially self-sufficient.15 1
The successful marketing of the minerals recovered from the deep sea-
bed will be an important factor in achieving financial self-sufficiency
for the Enterprise. Although not provided for in the Draft Convention,
access to the international metal market will be essential for the profit-
able distribution of minerals recovered by the Enterprise.'52
The international metal market has many characteristics of mo-
nopoly and this may present a marketing problem for the Enterprise.
These monopolistic features include raw material transfers such as
those within vertically integrated industrial corporations or those such
as long-term supply contracts between producer nations and industrial
consumers. Despite the monopoly characteristics of this market, the
London Metal Exchange may prove to be one accessible conduit for
the Enterprise's product.
Based upon current projections, the consumption of nickel, man-
ganese, cobalt and copper by the industrialized nations is not likely to
increase greatly over the next ten to twenty years. Even the growth of
151. The profits are partially intended for distribution to developing nations along
with revenues derived from mining profits of the mining consortia. See Darman, supra
note 11, at 383. See also Nigrelli, Ocean Mineral Revenue Sharing, 5 OCEAN DEv. &
INT'L L. 153 (1978). Nigrelli developed projections of the revenues from seabed mining
that will be available to the Authority. These are much less than once thought, and
considering that the land-based producers will initially be compensated from these reve-
nues, the remaining funds for distribution to developing nations will not be great. Id. at
164-76.
152. See Lee, supra note 87, at 70.
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demand for these minerals by developing countries is unlikely to result
in notable increases in world consumption. The marketing strategy of
the Enterprise, therefore, will be of great significance in achieving via-
bility as a successful mineral producer.
Presuming the Enterprise successfully mines and processes the
nodules, its initial output may be small relative to the total volume of
world output from all sources. Thus, at first, there would only be a
need to sell to relatively small quantity purchasers. If this is the case,
the Enterprise could gradually build a constituent market. Alterna-
tively, if the Enterprise is able to produce large quantites of minerals,
then access to purchasers may present difficulties due to the oversup-
ply of its product and an undersupply of purchasers.
B. Financing
The developed nations are providing substantial funding for the
Enterprise, but have only moderate desire for its sucessful competition
with the mining consortia. The developing nations have a substantial
interest in the successful operation of the Enterprise, but are providing
only a moderate portion of the funding. Nevertheless, the start-up
financing provisions for personnel and the purchase of equipment to
operate one complete mining operation generally appear sound. But
the total amount to be provided the Enterprise for its initial opera-
tional mine site should be fixed. A ceiling figure on this amount would
enhance certainty on the extent of the funding parties' obligations.
Such a ceiling would tend to quiet fears about runaway expenditures
by the Enterprise as it sets out to acquire the expensive technology
being developed for deep seabed mining. Indeed the projected initial
cost, one billion dollars, is substantial and probably will increase.
C. Technology
The provisions for technology transfer are designed to ensure that
the Enterprise is adequately prepared to perform mining operations.
To this end, a good faith effort from the mining parties that will be
providing technology and training to the Enterprise is essential.
The need for training"' is especially important because it involves
extended lead times. This applies to training in both technology utili-
zation and business management.15 4 These factors are very important
to the profitability and overall success of the Enterprise. It will not be
easy to evaluate the extent of good faith by the technology providers.
They may comply with the relevant provisions, but their willingness to
153. See Osgood, supra note 17, at 24.
154. The joint venture provision offers special opportunities to the Enterprise in this
respect. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
NOTE19811
N.Y.J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
do so expeditiously may become the subject of controversy.
Moreover, the transfer provisions related to proprietary informa-
tion should be clarified. The mining interests are concerned with pro-
tecting the security of technology that evolves through their invest-
ments in research and development. They will be naturally reluctant to
expose new and sensitive information. The Draft Convention does pro-
vide an exception for proprietary information under the technology
transfer obligations. But "proprietary" has not been defined in the
Draft Convention. A definition of this term would be useful so that all
the miners, both technology transferors and transferees, could better
understand their rights and obligations.
Finally, the developed nations desire quick processing of their li-
cense applications for seabed mining so that the mining operations can
move foreward with dispatch. Good faith timely handling of these ap-
plications by the Council may be forthcoming if there is evidence of
similar good faith efforts by the miners to provide technology, prompt
training and the other requirements of the Draft Convention to the
Enterprise.
D. Compromise
The numerous compromises involved in the provisions establishing
the International Sea-bed Authority were judged necessary to achieve
the common desire of all nations to use, and profit from, seabed re-
sources. The balancing of many competing interests and conflicting
claims resulted in this unique international commercial institution that
is the Enterprise.
It must be emphasized that the compromises achieved were only
possible to the extent that they reflected the aggregate common inter-
est of all nations. This interest is, of course, to expand the use and
productivity of the oceans and to ensure access to the oceans for all
peaceful purposes.
The Enterprise rests on the process of compromise, and has the
potential to work and be successful. This success depends to a signifi-
cant degree on a series of relationships including: (1) the cooperative-
ness of the developed countries that in turn depends greatly upon
whether or not serious problems arise in the relationship between the
miners and the Authority; (2) the working relationship between the
Enterprise and the Authority; and (3) the capacity, personal ability
and effectiveness of the Director-General and his authority in working
with the Governing Board.
As we have seen, clarifications may be necessary with respect to
critical relationships established in the Draft Convention. Objective
qualifications should be developed for selection of the Director-Gen-
eral. Perhaps the Director-General should be elected by the Governing
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Board and given voting rights on the Board. In addition, the Enter-
prise may need greater autonomy in its relationship to the Authority.
The desirability and construction of such clarifications should receive
further study by the delegates to the Preparatory Commission for the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Preparatory
Commission will then draft provisions to make possible the efficient
functioning of the Authority when the Draft Convention comes into
force.
It should be remembered that this evolving mining industry is new
in terms of the actors involved, the type of activity undertaken and
where it is taking place. As such, there will be unforeseen difficulties
for the Enterprise which can be minimized if it has effective access to
the funding and technology it needs.
An undertaking as ambitious as is the Enterprise will naturally
need some good luck to be successful. It certainly has the potential to
be successful, but optimism for the project must be tempered by a re-
alization of the magnitude of the undertaking.
Wayne R. Smith

